The Euro Interbank Repo Market
The search for a market design that ensures stable bank funding is at the top of regulators' policy agenda. This paper empirically shows that the central counterparty (CCP)-based euro interbank repo market features this stability. Using a unique and comprehensive data set, we show that the market is resilient during crisis episodes and may even act as a shock absorber, in the sense that repo lending increases with risk, while spreads, maturities, and haircuts remain stable. Our comparison across different repo markets shows that anonymous CCP-based trading, safe collateral, and the absence of an unwind mechanism are the key characteristics to ensure market resilience. Received October 22, 2014; accepted July 28, 2015 by Editor Stefan Nagel.
Authors: Loriano Mancini, Angelo Ranaldo, Jan Wrampelmeyer
Citations: 137
Published: 2015-09-16T00:00:00.000Z
Why It Matters
Venue: Review of Financial Studies. Year: 2015. Citations: 137. Abstract signal: The search for a market design that ensures stable bank funding is at the top of regulators' policy agenda. This paper empirically shows that the central counterparty (CCP)-based euro interbank repo market features this...
Abstract
The search for a market design that ensures stable bank funding is at the top of regulators' policy agenda. This paper empirically shows that the central counterparty (CCP)-based euro interbank repo market features this stability. Using a unique and comprehensive data set, we show that the market is resilient during crisis episodes and may even act as a shock absorber, in the sense that repo lending increases with risk, while spreads, maturities, and haircuts remain stable. Our comparison across different repo markets shows that anonymous CCP-based trading, safe collateral, and the absence of an unwind mechanism are the key characteristics to ensure market resilience. Received October 22, 2014; accepted July 28, 2015 by Editor Stefan Nagel.
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