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We study a toy two-player game for periodic double auction markets to generate liquidity. The game has imperfect information, which allows us to link market spreads with signal strength. We characterize Nash equilibria in cases with or without incentives from the exchange. This enables us to derive new insights about price formation and incentives design. We show in particular that without any incentives, the market …
We derive a slippage-aware toxicity condition for on-chain liquidations executed via a constant-product automated market maker (CP-AMM). For a fixed (constant) liquidation incentive $i$, the familiar toxicity frontier $ν< 1/(1+i)$ tightens to $ν< 1/((1+i)λ)$ for a liquidity penalty factor $λ$ that we derive for both the CP-AMM and a generalised form. Using a dynamic health-linked liquidation incentive $i(h) = i(1 - h…
Recent regulation on intraday electricity markets has led to the development of shared order books with the intention to foster competition and increase market liquidity. In this paper, we address the question of the efficiency of such regulations by analysing the situation of two exchanges sharing a single limit order book, i.e. a quote by a market maker can be hit by a trade arriving on the other exchange. We devel…
Retail proprietary-trading firms sell a two-stage product: a paid evaluation that must reach a profit target before breaching a trailing drawdown, then a funded account that must survive a minimum window and a consistency rule before a payout. We show the geometry of this contract creates incentives that differ by stage and make passing a poor standalone signal of skill. Under end-of-day trailing the evaluation rewar…
We consider the issue of a market maker acting at the same time in the lit and dark pools of an exchange. The exchange wishes to establish a suitable make-take fees policy to attract transactions on its venues. We first solve the stochastic control problem of the market maker without the intervention of the exchange. Then we derive the equations defining the optimal contract to be set between the market maker and the…
When the planning horizon is long, and the safe asset grows indefinitely, isoelastic portfolios are nearly optimal for investors who are close to isoelastic for high wealth, and not too risk averse for low wealth. We prove this result in a general arbitrage-free, frictionless, semimartingale model. As a consequence, optimal portfolios are robust to the perturbations in preferences induced by common option compensatio…
We consider models of financial markets in which all parties involved find incentives to participate. Strategies are evaluated directly by their virtual wealths. By tuning the price sensitivity and market impact, a phase diagram with several attractor behaviors resembling those of real markets emerge, reflecting the roles played by the arbitrageurs and trendsetters, and including a phase with irregular price trends a…
Prediction markets are starting to look less like crowd polls and more like electronic markets. The central question is therefore no longer only whether these markets forecast well, but what happens when institutional liquidity enters: do spreads tighten, does price discovery improve, and do those gains actually reach the traders who are slowest to react when information arrives? This paper offers a research design f…
We find the equilibrium contract that an automated market maker (AMM) offers to their strategic liquidity providers (LPs) in order to maximize the order flow that gets processed by the venue. Our model is formulated as a leader-follower stochastic game, where the venue is the leader and a representative LP is the follower. We derive approximate closed-form equilibrium solutions to the stochastic game and analyze the …
Everlasting options, a relatively new class of perpetual financial derivatives, have emerged to tackle the challenges of rolling contracts and liquidity fragmentation in decentralized finance markets. This paper offers an in-depth analysis of markets for everlasting options, modeled using a dynamic proactive market maker. We examine the behavior of funding fees and transaction costs across varying liquidity condition…
This paper conducts an empirical investigation into the effects of Designated Market Makers (DMMs) on key market quality indicators, such as liquidity, bid-ask spreads, and order fulfillment ratios. Through agent-based simulations, this study explores the impact of varying competition levels and incentive structures among DMMs on market dynamics. It aims to demonstrate that DMMs are crucial for enhancing market liqui…
Liquidity providers are currently incentivised to provide liquidity through the LP Incentives Programme on dYdX. Based on the various parameters - makerVolume, depths and spreads, they are rewarded accordingly based on their activities. Given the maturity of the BTC and ETH markets, alongside other altcoins which enjoy a consistent amount of liquidity, this paper aims to update the formula to encourage more active an…
This article studies a dynamic corporate risk management problem by considering the decision-making of risk-averse managers who exert costly effort and select project risk. We study how a Value-at-Risk (VaR) constraint affects managerial decisions and the distribution of firm value when the manager's objective is non-concave with a fixed salary and options. By the concavification technique, we analyze the optimal ter…
Financial speculators often seek to increase their potential gains with leverage. Debt is a popular form of leverage, and with over 39.88B USD of total value locked (TVL), the Decentralized Finance (DeFi) lending markets are thriving. Debts, however, entail the risks of liquidation, the process of selling the debt collateral at a discount to liquidators. Nevertheless, few quantitative insights are known about the exi…
EBIs/ESOs substantially change the traditional production/service function because ESOs/EBIs can have different psychological effects(motivation or de-motivation), and can create intangible capital and different economic payoffs. Although Game Theory is flawed, it can be helpful in describing interactions in ESO/EBIs transactions. ESOs/EBIs involve two-stage games and there are no perfect Nash Equilibria for the two …
We discuss a possible solution to an unintended consequence of having grades, certificates, rankings and other diversions in the act of transferring knowledge; and zoom in specifically to the topic of having grades, on a curve. We conduct a thought experiment, taking a chapter (and some more?) from the financial markets, (where we trade pollution and what not?), to create a marketplace, where we can trade our grade, …
The Proof of Efficient Liquidity (PoEL) protocol, designed for specialised Proof of Stake (PoS) consensus-based blockchains that incorporate intrinsic DeFi applications, aims to support sustainable liquidity bootstrapping and network security. This concept seeks to efficiently utilise budgeted staking rewards to attract and sustain liquidity through a risk-structuring engine and incentive allocation strategy, both of…
As decentralized finance (DeFi) evolves, distinguishing between user behaviors - liquidity provision versus active trading - has become vital for risk modeling and on-chain reputation. We propose a behavioral scoring framework for Uniswap that assigns two complementary scores: a Liquidity Provision Score that assesses strategic liquidity contributions, and a Swap Behavior Score that reflects trading intent, volatilit…