arXiv · arXiv q-fin · 2026
A physically backed leveraged event position requires real credit: if collateral C receives leverage L, the protocol supplies (L-1)C and uses the combined amount to acquire recognized event exposure. This paper develops a venue-agnostic on-chain credit architecture for that capital layer and an endogenous model of its capital market. It separates traders, Senior Credit LPs, market makers, liquidators, and Liquidation…
Maksym Nechepurenko
arXiv · arXiv q-fin · 2024
Decentralized Finance (DeFi), a financial ecosystem without centralized controlling organization, has introduced a new paradigm for lending and borrowing. However, its capital efficiency remains constrained by the inability to effectively assess the risk associated with each user/wallet. This paper introduces the 'On-Chain Credit Risk Score (OCCR Score) in DeFi', a probabilistic measure designed to quantify the credi…
Rik Ghosh, Arka Datta, Vidhi Aggarwal, Sudipan Sinha, Rajdeep Sengupta
arXiv · arXiv · 2023
This whitepaper introduces an innovative mechanism for pricing perpetual contracts and quoting fees to traders based on current market conditions. The approach employs liquidity curves and on-chain oracles to establish a new adaptive pricing framework that considers various factors, ensuring pricing stability and predictability. The framework utilizes parabolic and sigmoid functions to quote prices and fees, accounti…
Chester Bella, Danny Boahen, Sudeep Biswas
arXiv · arXiv · 2023
On-chain data (metrics) of blockchain networks, akin to company fundamentals, provide crucial and comprehensive insights into the networks. Despite their informative nature, on-chain data have not been utilized in reinforcement learning (RL)-based systems for cryptocurrency (crypto) portfolio management (PM). An intriguing subject is the extent to which the utilization of on-chain data can enhance an RL-based system'…
Zhenhan Huang, Fumihide Tanaka
arXiv · arXiv · 2026
Financial options are fundamental to traditional markets, enabling strategies ranging from hedging to speculating. Yet, while the Automated Market Maker paradigm has revolutionized decentralized spot markets, no equivalent standard has emerged for on-chain options. Typical designs attempt to replicate centralized exchange mechanics, requiring high-frequency oracles and robust liquidation engines which may fail during…
Maxim Bichuch, Zachary Feinstein
arXiv · arXiv · 2026
This paper emphasizes the critical role of interoperability in enabling efficient and secure communication for the fragmented distributed ledger ecosystem, particularly within on-chain finance. The purpose of this study is to streamline and accelerate empirical research on the intersection of cross-chain interoperability solutions and their impact within on-chain finance. The analysis examines the relationship betwee…
Hasret Ozan Sevim
arXiv · arXiv q-fin · 2025
Prediction markets have gained adoption as on-chain mechanisms for aggregating information, with platforms such as Polymarket demonstrating demand for stablecoin-denominated markets. However, denominating in non-interest-bearing stablecoins introduces inefficiencies: participants face opportunity costs relative to the fiat risk-free rate, and Bitcoin holders in particular lose exposure to BTC appreciation when conver…
Fedor Shabashev
arXiv · arXiv q-fin · 2025
As decentralized finance (DeFi) evolves, distinguishing between user behaviors - liquidity provision versus active trading - has become vital for risk modeling and on-chain reputation. We propose a behavioral scoring framework for Uniswap that assigns two complementary scores: a Liquidity Provision Score that assesses strategic liquidity contributions, and a Swap Behavior Score that reflects trading intent, volatilit…
Dhanashekar Kandaswamy, Ashutosh Sahoo, Akshay SP, Gurukiran S, Parag Paul
arXiv · arXiv q-fin · 2024
In decentralized finance, any individual can pool their assets into an automated market maker (AMM) -- herein we focus on the constant product market maker (CPMM) -- in exchange for a claim on a fraction of future pool assets and fees earned from the market making operations. This position is represented by a liquidity token, whose prevailing on-chain price is effectively the initial deposited assets. Though this pri…
Maxim Bichuch, Zachary Feinstein
arXiv · arXiv · 2022
Synthetic assets are decentralized finance (DeFi) analogues of derivatives in the traditional finance (TradFi) world - financial arrangements which derive value from and are directly pegged to fluctuations in the value of an underlying asset (ex: futures and options). Synthetic assets occupy a unique niche, serving to facilitate currency exchange, giving traders a means to speculate on the value of crypto assets with…
Abrar Rahman, Victor Shi, Matthew Ding, Elliot Choi
arXiv · arXiv q-fin · 2026
Sunshine trading theory predicts that publicly disclosing trading intentions can reduce adverse selection and attract liquidity provision, lowering execution costs. Evidence is scarce, because explicit preannouncement of large orders is rare in traditional markets. We study Hyperliquid, a fully on-chain limit order book for cryptocurrency perpetual futures, where protocol-native TWAP orders disclose their terms from …
Davide Barone, Fabrizio Lillo
arXiv · arXiv · 2025
The tokenization of real-world assets (RWAs) promises to transform financial markets by enabling fractional ownership, global accessibility, and programmable settlement of traditionally illiquid assets such as real estate, private credit, and government bonds. While technical progress has been rapid, with over \$25 billion in tokenized RWAs brought on-chain as of 2025, liquidity remains a critical bottleneck. This pa…
Rischan Mafrur
arXiv · arXiv · 2025
Cryptocurrency portfolio management requires the fusion of heterogeneous multi-modal signals, including structured price and on-chain time series, unstructured news text, and technical indicators, under high-volatility and real-time constraints. While deep learning approaches show predictive capability, their opacity limits practical adoption, and single large language model (LLM) agents struggle to process the bread…
Yichen Luo, Yebo Feng, Jiahua Xu, Paolo Tasca, Yang Liu
arXiv · arXiv · 2022
Lending Protocols (LPs), as blockchain-based lending systems, allow any agents to borrow and lend cryptocurrencies. However, liquidity risks could occur, especially when salient loans are initiated by a particular group of borrowers. This paper proposes measurements of liquidity risks, focusing on both available liquidity and market concentration in LPs. By using Aave as a case study, we find that liquidity risks are…
Xiaotong Sun, Charalampos Stasinakis, Georgios Sermpinis
arXiv · arXiv · 2026
We study seven major crypto-perpetual liquidation cascades (2022-2025), and in the largest of them we can watch the mechanism directly. From the on-chain fill log of a fully transparent venue we measure the branching ratio of that event -- the October 2025 crash, the largest on record -- in flight, with both of its factors observed and no free constants. It ran deeply subcritical: the structural ratio and the amplifi…
Ramon Marc Garcia Seuma
arXiv · arXiv · 2026
We study permissionless spot--perpetual basis trading in decentralized finance as a collateral control problem. The strategy holds spot inventory, hedges directional exposure with a short perpetual, and allocates capital between spot inventory and derivative margin under on-chain liquidity and execution frictions. The paper delivers three results. First, it solves a static control problem for the collateral share and…
Anatoly Krestenko, Mikhail Butov, Rostislav Berezovskiy, Danila Bolotin
arXiv · arXiv · 2026
Algorithmic stablecoins promise decentralized monetary stability by maintaining a target peg through programmatic reserve management. Yet, their reserve controllers remain vulnerable to regime-blind optimization, calibrating risk parameters on fair-weather data while ignoring tail events that precipitate cascading failures. The March 2020 Black Thursday collapse, wherein MakerDAO's collateral auctions yielded $8.3M i…
Shengwei You, Aditya Joshi, Andrey Kuehlkamp, Jarek Nabrzyski
arXiv · arXiv · 2025
We derive a slippage-aware toxicity condition for on-chain liquidations executed via a constant-product automated market maker (CP-AMM). For a fixed (constant) liquidation incentive $i$, the familiar toxicity frontier $ν< 1/(1+i)$ tightens to $ν< 1/((1+i)λ)$ for a liquidity penalty factor $λ$ that we derive for both the CP-AMM and a generalised form. Using a dynamic health-linked liquidation incentive $i(h) = i(1 - h…
Alexander McFarlane