arXiv · arXiv · 2025
Understanding how market participants react to shocks like scheduled macroeconomic news is crucial for both traders and policymakers. We develop a calibrated data generation process DGP that embeds four stylized trader archetypes retail, pension, institutional, and hedge funds into an extended CAPM augmented by CPI surprises. Each agents order size choice is driven by a softmax discrete choice rule over small, medium…
Haochuan Wang
arXiv · arXiv · 2025
We study a multi-agent setting in which brokers transact with an informed trader. Through a sequential Stackelberg-type game, brokers manage trading costs and adverse selection with an informed trader. In particular, supplying liquidity to the informed traders allows the brokers to speculate based on the flow information. They simultaneously attempt to minimize inventory risk and trading costs with the lit market bas…
Ryan Donnelly, Zi Li
arXiv · arXiv · 2019
We propose a method to infer lead-lag networks of traders from the observation of their trade record as well as to reconstruct their state of supply and demand when they do not trade. The method relies on the Kinetic Ising model to describe how information propagates among traders, assigning a positive or negative "opinion" to all agents about whether the traded asset price will go up or down. This opinion is reflect…
Carlo Campajola, Fabrizio Lillo, Daniele Tantari
arXiv · arXiv · 2026
Automated market maker (AMM) fee rules are often evaluated by liquidity-provider (LP) welfare, but that objective mixes fee revenue, adverse-selection loss (loss-versus-rebalancing, LVR), routing response, and liquidity supply. Fixed-fee Uniswap v3 history cannot separate these channels or identify counterfactual trader-facing dynamic-fee rules. Real fee-related variation nonetheless exists: the Uniswap protocol-fee …
Wen-Ting Wang
arXiv · arXiv · 2026
We show that net demand for liquidity by algo strategies is identifiable from its trade and price history alone, with no knowledge of its signal or optimization problem. An exact multi-period regret decomposition implies that the sign of this statistic classifies a linear strategy as a net liquidity consumer or provider, recovering the Kyle (1985) informed-trader/market-maker dichotomy from observables alone. Under a…
Irene Aldridge
arXiv · arXiv · 2026
Privacy-preserving exchange designs price on a coarsened view of order flow. We show that a market maker committed to informationally efficient (posterior-mean) pricing on a signal strictly coarser than the flow it settles necessarily cedes a closed-form welfare transfer to traders -- the privacy subsidy -- and that no rule restricted to the coarse signal is simultaneously efficient and zero-profit against the settle…
Yuki Nakamura
arXiv · arXiv · 2026
Prediction markets are starting to look less like crowd polls and more like electronic markets. The central question is therefore no longer only whether these markets forecast well, but what happens when institutional liquidity enters: do spreads tighten, does price discovery improve, and do those gains actually reach the traders who are slowest to react when information arrives? This paper offers a research design f…
Shaw Dalen
arXiv · arXiv · 2025
We study the economic viability of liquidity provision in decentralised exchanges (DEXs) within a structural framework in which market outcomes are endogenous. We formulate strategic interactions as a sequential game: a risk-averse liquidity provider (LP) sets the supply of liquidity in the DEX and a costly dynamic replication strategy in a centralised exchange (CEX), price-sensitive traders determine trading volumes…
Fayçal Drissi, Xuchen Wu, Sebastian Jaimungal
arXiv · arXiv · 2025
We establish a general matched filter principle for order flow normalization: optimal normalization must match the scaling behaviour of the signal-generating process. For capacity-constrained institutional investors, market capitalization normalization ($S^{MC}$) is the matched filter; for volume-targeting traders (e.g., VWAP/TWAP algorithms), trading value normalization ($S^{TV}$) is optimal. Monte Carlo simulations…
Sungwoo Kang
arXiv · arXiv · 2025
We study the problem of optimal liquidity withdrawal for a representative liquidity provider (LP) in an automated market maker (AMM). LPs earn fees from trading activity but are exposed to impermanent loss (IL) due to price fluctuations. While existing work has focused on static provision and exogenous exit strategies, we characterise the optimal exit time as the solution to a stochastic control problem with an endog…
Philippe Bergault, Sébastien Bieber, Leandro Sánchez-Betancourt
arXiv · arXiv · 2025
Passive liquidity providers (LPs) in automated market makers (AMMs) face losses due to adverse selection (LVR), which static trading fees often fail to offset in practice. We study the key determinants of LP profitability in a dynamic reduced-form model where an AMM operates in parallel with a centralized exchange (CEX), traders route their orders optimally to the venue offering the better price, and arbitrageurs exp…
Steven Campbell, Philippe Bergault, Jason Milionis, Marcel Nutz
arXiv · arXiv · 2025
Everlasting options, a relatively new class of perpetual financial derivatives, have emerged to tackle the challenges of rolling contracts and liquidity fragmentation in decentralized finance markets. This paper offers an in-depth analysis of markets for everlasting options, modeled using a dynamic proactive market maker. We examine the behavior of funding fees and transaction costs across varying liquidity condition…
Hardhik Mohanty, Giovanni Zaarour, Bhaskar Krishnamachari
arXiv · arXiv · 2025
In this paper, we describe a novel agent-based approach for modelling the transaction cost of buying or selling an asset in financial markets, e.g., to liquidate a large position as a result of a margin call to meet financial obligations. The simple act of buying or selling in the market causes a price impact and there is a cost described as liquidity risk. For example, when selling a large order, there is market sli…
Perukrishnen Vytelingum, Rory Baggott, Namid Stillman, Jianfei Zhang, Dingqiu Zhu
arXiv · arXiv · 2025
Decentralized exchanges (DEXs) face persistent challenges in liquidity retention and user engagement due to inefficiencies in conventional automated market maker (AMM) designs. This work proposes a dual-mechanism framework to address these limitations: a ``Better Market Maker (BMM)'', which is a liquidity-optimized AMM based on a power-law invariant ($X^nY = K$, $n = 4$), and a dynamic rebate system (DRS) for redistr…
CY Yan, Steve Keol, Xo Co, Nate Leung
arXiv · arXiv · 2024
We develop a new framework to detect wash trading in crypto assets through real-time liquidity fluctuation. We propose that short-term price jumps in crypto assets results from wash trading-induced liquidity fluctuation, and construct two complementary liquidity measures, liquidity jump (size of fluctuation) and liquidity diffusion (volatility of fluctuation), to capture the behavioral signature of wash trading. Usin…
Qi Deng, Zhong-Guo Zhou
arXiv · arXiv · 2024
Optimal execution is an important problem faced by any trader. Most solutions are based on the assumption of constant market impact, while liquidity is known to be dynamic. Moreover, models with time-varying liquidity typically assume that it is observable, despite the fact that, in reality, it is latent and hard to measure in real time. In this paper we show that the use of Double Deep Q-learning, a form of Reinforc…
Andrea Macrì, Fabrizio Lillo
arXiv · arXiv · 2023
This whitepaper introduces an innovative mechanism for pricing perpetual contracts and quoting fees to traders based on current market conditions. The approach employs liquidity curves and on-chain oracles to establish a new adaptive pricing framework that considers various factors, ensuring pricing stability and predictability. The framework utilizes parabolic and sigmoid functions to quote prices and fees, accounti…
Chester Bella, Danny Boahen, Sudeep Biswas
arXiv · arXiv · 2023
This paper aims to enhance the understanding of liquidity provider (LP) returns in automated market makers (AMMs). LPs face market risk as well as adverse selection due to risky asset holdings in the pool that they provide liquidity to and the informational asymmetry between informed traders (arbitrageurs) and AMMs. Loss-versus-rebalancing (LVR) quantifies the adverse selection cost (Milionis et al., 2022a), and is a…
Jason Milionis, Xin Wan, Austin Adams